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Tariffs vs. Quotas as Revenue Raising
Devices under Uncertainty
By PARTHA D A S G U P T A AND JOSEPH STIGLITZ*
The relative merits of a tariff and a quota
at the border for achieving a government
objective have been discussed a good deal
in the literature.' It has long been recog-
nized that, provided the government auc-
tions off the quota, the optimum pure tariff
and the optimum pure quota are equivalent
in a competitive world with no uncertainty.-
The proposition continues to hold if there is
uncertainty, but where every agent, includ-
ing the government, can monitor (and
therefore distinguish) costiessly every state
of nature. However, in such a world the
equivalence is between a pure tariff and a
pure quota that are both functions of the
state of nature.' It is this last observation
that leads us to suspect that the equivalence
result is of rather limited practical use. One
would imagine thai the possible states of
nature are large in number. It is then dilli-
cult to envisage a government announcing a
trade policy that is contingent entirely on
the state of nature. Such a policy would be
costly to calculate and ditliculi to compre-
hend. We are therefore encouraged to
simplify a good deal and to restrict the set
of admissible trade policies. But this is a
difficult matter. It is by no means immediate
what restrictions would appear as being
natural lo contemplate. The border policies
that are most commonly resorted to by gov-
ernments are tixed tariff rates and fixed
quantity restrictions. They are often re-
garded as polar forms of trade restrictions
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^ By a pure tariff rale we mean a laritT rale that is in-
dependent of the quantity traded. Likewise, by a pure
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(one involving prices and the other involv-
ing quantities). They have very different
effects: a fixed tariff on a commodity sta-
bilizes its domestic price in the face of ran-
dom domestic demand and supply but a
fixed international price: while a quota
stabilizes its domestic price if its interna-
tional price is random but its domestic de-
mand and supply functions are fixed.
The major purpose of this paper is to ex-
amine the relative merits of these two trade
policies in the presence of uncertainty. The
central result that we shall present here
came somewhat as a surprise lo us. Under
the conventional criterion of maximizing
the expected value of net consumer's sur-
plus, the optimum fixed tariff is superior to
ihe optimum fixed quota. The result con-
tinues lo hold if instead the maxi-min crite-
rion is followed. Section 1 is concerned with
this is.sue. In Section II we discuss in what
sense bolh tariffs and quotas may be viewed
as special cases of a more general class of
trade policies, and how the problem of the
choice of an optimum trade policy may be
viewed as an example of a general class of
problems arising out of imperfect informa-
tion.
I. Tariffs versus Quotas
Imagine a commodity thai can be bolh
produced domestically under competitive
conditions and at the same time imported.
Denoting by q its domestic price and by D
its domestic demand, we suppose that the
market demand curve can be represented
(1) q = a - 0D
where jS is a positive constant and where a
*\n what follows, a tilde above a variable will imply
that the variable is random, and a bar above it will de-
note its expected value. Thus, for example, £"(0) 5 Q.
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FIGURE I
is a random variable with a known distribu-
tion. Writing S as the domestic supply of
the commodity, we take it that the domestic
supply function can be represented as*
(2) g = y + SS
where 6 is a positive constant and where y
is a random variable. In short, we are
postulating linear demand and supply
curves, each of which possesses an unbiased
shift parameter. (See Figure I.) Alterna-
tively, one could suppose that all the ran-
dom variables have small variances, so that
we would be justified in taking linear ap-
proximations of the domestic demand and
supply functions at the optimum tariff
point.
The economy in question is assumed to
be small in that its import requirement does
not influence the foreign price. The import
price p is not known with certainty but is
random with a known distribution.
Given that the commodity is domestically
produced under competitive conditions the
domestic cost function C(5) is the integral
of supply curve:
(3) C\S) =
*Il is, of course, possible to present the analysis by
postulating directly the excess demand function, rather
than working separately with ihe demand and supply
functions. The final result that we shall present sub-
sequently IS. however, easier to dissect if »e consider
them separately.
(Without loss of generality we are setting
the constant of integration at zero.) Like-
wise, consumer's gross benefit B{0) from
(I) can be expressed as
(4) B{D) = aD - ^ D' =
Given that we are concerned here with the
relative merits of a pure tariff and a pure
quota we need an account of the rationale
for introducing a trade restriction. Assume
then that the government desires to intro-
duce such a restriction with a view to rais-
ing a given expected level of revenue R, and
to keep matters simple we take it that the
government is risk neutral. Now it is plain
that there arc various manners in which the
government can introduce trade restrictions
in order to ensure an expected level of reve-
nue R, Let £ denote the expectation op-
erator. We suppose that il ranks various
feasible policies in accordance with the
function
W' = EiB{D) - C(5) -pi)
where / i s the equilibrium level of import.''
By way of contrast let us look at the first
best formulation of the problem initially.
For this economy a state of nature is char-
acterized by a triplet of numbers {d,y,p).
In order to raise the expected level of reve-
nue R, the government would announce an
ad valorem tariff t, contingent on the state
of nature. Writing by l(a,y,p) the quantity
imported in the state ot nature (a, 7,p), and
using (I) and (2). a market equilibrium
would be characterized by the condition
(5)
In what follows we shall take it for sim-
*ln other words, the government ranks policies in
accordance to their contributions lo the expected value
of the sum of the surpluses accruing to consumers and
producers. (Note Ihai it makes no difference whether
the government ranks projects according to £[B -
C - pi] or E[6 - C - ^I] since they differ by exactly
R.)
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plicity that the ranges of the random vari-
ables a, y, and p are small in the sense that
in the absence of any trade restrictions (i.e.,
lia,y,p) = 0), one has for all realizations
of d , 7 , and p, l(a,y,p) > 0. To keep the
analysis uncomplicated we shall subse-
quently assume as well that R is small in a
sense that will be made precise.
The government's problem would then
consist of determining a tariff schedule
t^ei,y,p) that will maximize E(B{D) -
CiS) - pi), subject to the constraint (5)
and the condition
(6) E{ptia,y,p)I(a,y,p)) = R
Assume for the moment that an optimum
exists. It is of course plain that whether the
government announced the resulting opti-
mal tariff schedule t*{a,y,p) or instead
uses (5) to auction off the corresponding
import quota schedule I*{a,y,p) is a
matter of indifference. This is the classical
equivalence between tariffs and quotas.
More generally, from equations (3), (4),






It follows that policies will be ranked simply
on the basis of the value of
(8) Z H E(pq) -
We are now concerned with the second
best problem, where the admissible set of
trade policies is severely restricted. We sup-
pose that the government can costiessly
monitor the total volume of imports, /, and
can therefore base Its trade restriction on /;
but that a, 7, and p are separately unob-
servable, and therefore it cannot base trade
policies on them.' In this section we focus
'Thus we rule out by assumption the possibility of
smuggling. This raises rather different issues.
attention on two of the simplest of such
trade policies, namely: I) a pure tariff
/(/) = / (a constant): and 2) a pure quota /,
which is equivalent to an implicit specific
tariff T given by the rule T = q - p for
q > p and /(a, ^,p) < /, and T = x for
Ii&,y,p) > /.* In whal follows we analyze
the two sequentially. (See the accompanying
figure.)
A. Pure Tariff
Denote by / the pure ad valorem tariff. It
follows from equation (5) that the import
function is of the form
and from the revenue constraint (6) that
(10) R = E(ptl) = tEipI)
To analyze the issues involved it is simplest
(though not essential) to suppose that the
random variables a, y, p., are all pair-wise
independent of one another. We can then
use equation (9) in equation (10) to obtain a
quadratic equation in /:
(II) p{ad +
= 0
If/? is too large, there will be no real solu-
tion for r. There is then no feasible pure
tariff policy. Consequently we take it that
R is small. Of the two real solutions of (11)
it is the smaller tariff rate which yields a
higher level of expected net benefits. It is
this smaller value we are interested in. De-
note it by /*. To get a tidy expression for
t* it will be convenient to assume that R is
small enough so as to enable one to ignore
*ln what follows we shall suppose thai the ranges of
a, -y, and p are sufficiently small and the quota is not
overly large. Consequently we shall take it that q > p
and hence the quotu is binding. It follows that strictly
sr>eaking one does not need to set r = x for /(«. f,/)) >
/. A large enough r will do. Notice that as the quota is.
by a.s.sumption, auctioned off, the implicit lariflF associ-
ated with a quota is random.
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all the second and higher powers of R. Con-
sequently from (11) one has'
(12) t* ^
It follows then that
(13)
+ m -{0
Under a pure tariff scheme the market-
clearing price is random as long as the for-
eign price is random.
Thus, on using equation (8) one obtains
(for small/!)
B. Pure Quota
If a pure import quota / is announced
and auctioned off, the resulting domestic
price q in equilibrium is obtained from
equation (5):
5
Thus, the uncertainty in the equilibrium
price resulting from a quota is due solely to
the uncertainty in the domestic supply and
demand conditions. The uncertainty in the
foreign price has no bearing on this. All this
is. of course, obvious. Now if q is the equi-
librium market price, the implicit specific
tariff f due to the quota in equilibrium is
(16) = q - p
which, on using in (15) yields
(17) 5:5 -I- 710 p ~ 0510+5 " 0+5
E(jl) is the expected revenue by an auction
of the quota / in a risk-neutral market.
Therefore condition (6) implies that
(18) R = E(fl) = IE(f)
'Notice that the validity of the approximation for
/* depends on the magnitude of the right-hand side of
equation (12). while the requirement that g>p (see
fn. 8) implies restriction of the range of (a, y,p).
Using equation (17) and (18) yields a qua-
dratic expression in /:
+ +
05
There are then two feasible quota specifica-
tions. Plainly the larger of the two solutions
of equation (19) yields higher expected net
benefits: denote it by /*. It follows that
(20) / y0 - 5)
05
R{0 + 5)
a5 + y0 - p(0 + d)
Using equations (15) and (20) now yields
the equilibrium price under the pure quota
scheme as
( 2 1 ) q = P R05
a5 + y0 -^ Pi0 + b)
(a - a)5 + (y ~ y)0
"^  0 + 5
As before, we are concerned with the level
of expected net benefits under the optimum
pure quota level /*.
From equation (8) and (21) one then ob-
tains
(22)
where al and a}, are the variances of a and
y, respectively.
C. Comparison
We have finally to compare (14) and (22)
to determine which of the two schemes is
superior. Since a^ = E(p^) - p^, it follows
that
7
larig '-quoi"^tariff "quota —
5al (0
20(0 + b) 25(^ + 5) 20b
Equation (23) is the basic result of this
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paper and in what follows we comment on
it. Notice first that the reason why moments
of order higher than the variance do not ap-
pear in (23) is the fact that the government's
objective function is quadratic. Notice as
well that ifffj = al = a; = 0, then H',^ ,^  =
^nuoia- This last is, of course, the classical
equivalence result. However, the interesting
feature of equation (23) is that so long as
at least one of the variances is positive,
^uriff > ^quota- In Other words, a pure tariff
is unambiguously superior to a pure quota in
generating a given expected level of govern-
ment revenue.
We had not anticipated this result. In-
deed, we had supposed that the relative
merits of a tariff and a quota would depend
on the relative steepnesses of the demand
and supply functions, and possibly also on
the relative magnitudes of the coefficients of
variation of the different random variables.
No doubt under more general formulations
of the excess demand function there are cir-
cumstances in which a pure quota is a
superior policy measure to a pure tariff. But
a linear excess demand function is the sim-
plest laboratory in which to raise this ques-
tion. At any rate, within the confines of
such a formulation the answer emerges as
being unambiguous.
The result is particularly telling for the
situation where al > o-^  = o-; = 0. It is un-
der this circumstance that a pure quota is a
stabilizing policy. Under such a regime
there is no uncertainty in the domestic equi-
librium price (see equation (21)).'"' Conse-
quently there is no uncertainty in the sum
of the surpluses accruing to producers and
consumers. However, with a pure tariff the
domestic equilibrium price Is random (see
equation (13)). It might then be thought
that given risk aversion on the part of the
private sector, a quota would be a superior
policy measure to a tariff in generating the
required government revenue. What this
argument overlooks is the fact that ihe
"*This mav well be an jmphcit argument In justifying
the European Economic Community (HbC) policy of
stabilizing clomestic price by setting a tariff contingent
on the imported price of commodities which is pre-
cisely what a quota achieves.
quota does not allow for variations In im-
ports, say, when the social cost of imports
is low (because p is low) or when the value
of imports is high (for example, because d
is large). This relative adaptability of tariffs
has long been argued as one of its advan-
tages. The result here makes precise the
sense in which this is true.
Remarkably enough the result does not
depend on the assumption of risk neutrality
with respect to net consumer's surplus. Sup-
pose instead infinite risk aversion and con-
sequently ihat policies are ranked by the
function
W = min(B - C - pi)
With the max-min criteria the same result
obtains, for on using equations (12) and
(20), routine calculations yield
w ~ w —
" lariff " quota ~
0 + h




y0 - p(0 + 6)
> 0
II. Second Best Optimum Tariff Schedules
The analysis of the previous section could
be viewed as one concerning the optimum
tariff schedule when the admissible set of
policies is restricted to the fixed tariff and
the fixed quota. It was noted that this was
an immense restriction. It emerged that
even for small expected revenue require-
ments there are only four feasible policies
in all (sec equations (II) and (19)). Com-
puting the optimum border policy was then
an easy enough matter. The central result of
this paper was that the fixed ad valorem
tariff/* in equation (12) is the optimum of
this restricted set of policies.
Now. there is of course no reason why in
principle we should restrict our attention to
the fixed tariff and quota as admissible
policies. The tariff schedules need to be
based on observables, and ought to be ad-
ministratively simple. For instance, it may
be relatively easy to monitor the volume of
imports but difficult to monitor the true
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price (for example, because of kickbacks,
special credit facilities, etc.). Thus we could
imagine the government announcing an ad
valorem tariff rate t{I). In order that such a
function yields an outcome it must result in




The aim may then be to select a schedule
/*(/) that maximizes W = E{B(D) -
c(5) ^ ph
It is clear from this formulation that the
problem of optimum tariff structure, as we
have posed it, is yet another example of a
wide class of optimum control problems
with imperfect information which share a
common structure. Other examples include
the analysis of sharecropping with risk and
incentive effects (for example, Stephen
Cheung: Stiglitz, 1974): the choice of an
optimum income tax structure (for example,
Ray Fair; James Mirrlees, 1971, 1974, 1976;
Eytan Sheshinski; Anthony Atkinson and
Stiglitz: the analysis of insurance markets
(for example, Kenneth Arrow; A. Michael
Spence and Richard Zeckhauser; Mark
Pauly; and Stiglitz, 1975c); the use of piece
rates versus time rates in labor contracts
(for example, John Pencavel, Stiglitz,
1975b); the determination of the optimum
tarifr structure for utilities (for example,
Martin Weitzman, 1974a; Spence, 1975);
the analysis of education as a screening de-
vice (for example, Spence, 1974; Stiglitz,
1975a): the question of using prices or
quantities in planning (for example. Weitz-
man, 1974b; Mark Roberts and Spence).
We have gone into the nature of the com-
mon structure of these seemingly diverse
problems in Dasgupta and Stiglitz.
We should perhaps emphasize that we
have restricted ourselves to the pure tariff
and the pure quota cases not only because
of ease of calculation. There is in addition
the question of whether it Is reasonable to
imagine a government announcing and ad-
ministering hopelessly complicated tariff
schedules. Approximations to the optimum
are therefore required, and it is this that is
achieved by restricting the admissible set of
tariff schedules to those that are simple in
form. But still a fixed tariff may be unduly
restrictive. One could well imagine, for ex-
ample, that an appropriately chosen two-
tier tariff structure would prove superior to
the pure tariff rate t*. Formally, stjch a
schedule would read /(/) = /j for / < /, and
/(/) = tj for I > I; normally /, 5^  ti for an
optimum: that is, an optimum two-tier
tariff would be superior to a single tariff
rate.
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